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Avicenna’s and Mullā Ṣadrā’s Arguments for Immateriality of the Soul 
from the Viewpoint of Physicalism 
 
Abstract: 
I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main 
strands of Islamic philosophy, and then consider some arguments for the 
immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will first overview Avicenna’s theory of the 
spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī) of the soul and his version of substance 
dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the physical incipience (al-
ḥudūth al-jismānī) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards 
immateriality on his account. 
I will then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments presented 
by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality of the soul. 
To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary physicalistic views 
of the nature of mind and mental states. I will then argue that arguments for the 
immateriality of the soul – dealt with here – do not indeed target or challenge any 
significant versions of contemporary physicalism. Moreover, these arguments 
involve conflations of epistemological or ontological issues. 
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Islamic psychology or the study of the psyche began with substance dualism as 
maintained by al-Fārābī and Avicenna (or Ibn Sīnā) and was then developed into 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s two-stage monism. Since the philosophies of Avicenna and Mullā 
Ṣadrā are the two main philosophical strands of the Islamic world and attracted 
many followers and advocates, I will briefly consider the views of these two 
Muslim philosophers about the emergence of the soul and its nature, as well as 
some of the chief arguments for the immateriality of the soul. 
The two philosophers provide different accounts of the incipience (that is, the 
state of coming to exist) and immateriality of the soul although they both agree 
that the soul is immaterial (albeit in different ways or to varying extents). Thus, 
many of the arguments already presented by Avicenna in favor of the 
immateriality of the soul were later deployed by Mullā Ṣadrā with modifications 
or supplementations. The major part of Islamic psychology consists of arguments 
for the immateriality of the soul, which have been frequently discussed. In this 
paper, however, I adopt a new approach to show that these arguments can be 
challenged for different reasons, and in many cases, they essentially fail to serve 




Avicenna’s View of the Spiritual Incipience of the Soul 
For Avicenna, the soul is a substance distinct from the bodily substance. In 
general, the soul does two kinds of actions: in relation to the body, it controls and 
manipulates the body, and in relation to its own essence, it perceives intelligibles 
(ma’qūlāt, or universal concepts). In Avicenna’s view, the two kinds of actions 
are mutually exclusive. That is to say, whenever the soul is engaged in one kind 
of action, it will be distracted from the other, and thus, it is extremely difficult for 
the soul to do both actions at the same time.1 
Avicenna draws an analogy between the human soul’s manipulation of the body 
and a sea captain’s manipulation of the ship, although he admits that the analogy 
does not hold in all respects. For one thing, the soul is, in itself, abstract or 
detached from space. The common parlance that “the soul is in the body” is 
grounded in the fact that the soul’s control, stimulations, cognitions, and the rest 
of its faculties are specific to this particular body; the soul came to exist when the 
body came to exist, and the relation or attachment between them holds as long as 
the body continues to exist. When the body decays, the substance of the soul will 
survive as detached and immaterial.2 
                                                           
1. H. AVICENNA, Al-Shifā’; Al-Ṭabī’īyyāt [The book of Healing; Natural Sciences], 
3 vols. (Qom: Ayatollah al-Mar’ashi Library, 1404 AH), vol. II (The section on 
Psychology), 195.  
2. H. AVICENNA, al-Mabda’ wa l-Ma’ād [The Origin and the Resurrection], (Tehran: 
Mu’assese-ye Muṭāli’āt-e Eslāmī, 1363 SH), 105. 
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Avicenna’s belief in the spiritual incipience of the soul was grounded in problems 
arising from the rival view, that is, the eternity (qidam) of the soul—the view that 
souls existed before their attachment to the body. One main problem Avicenna 
and his followers – like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī3 - detected in the theory of the 
spiritual eternity of the soul was that if immaterial souls existed before their 
attachment to bodies, then each of these souls must be distinct from others. 
However, what would be the ground of such distinction? Their distinction would 
be grounded either in their quiddity and its necessary or essential concomitants, 
or in its accidental properties. The former is impossible, because human souls are 
of the same kind; hence, they are the same with respect to their quiddity and its 
necessary concomitants. The latter is also problematic because the incipience of 
accidental properties of a soul hinges on a divisible matter or attachment to a 
body; that is, distinction among souls can only occur in virtue of space, time, and 
properties such as color and size. Such accidental properties do not exist prior to 
                                                           
3. AL-RĀZĪ, Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad (b. c. 1149–d. 1210) was one of the most 
important philosophers and theologians of the post-classical period of Islam, that is, 
the period after al-Ghazali (d. 1111). In philosophy, Fakhr al-Dīn rearranged the 
structure of the philosophical summa in the Islamic East and thus also the curriculum 
of philosophical studies. His work completes the process of integrating the discourse 
of Aristotelian philosophy (falsafa) into Muslim rationalist theology (kalam), a 
process that began with the works of Avicenna.  
Fakhr al-Din’s works were widely studied, particularly during the 13th and 14th 
centuries. His commentaries on Ibn Sina’s works, in which he often keeps a critical 
distance to falsafa, became the subject of super-commentaries that are among the most 
influential texts in Arabic philosophy and Islamic theology.  





the attachment of the soul to a particular body, and thus, they cannot ground 
distinction among multiple souls prior to such attachment.4  
Moreover, Avicenna explains that an immaterial soul is abstract or detached from 
matter and material accidents prior to its attachment to a particular body, and the 
fact that the soul comes to possess accidents that are not necessitated by its 
quiddity implies a prior potentiality or disposition within the soul for having such 
accidents. This prior potentiality or disposition can exist only in something that 
is essentially a pure potentiality, which is nothing but a bodily matter. Thus, the 
assumption of the existence of the soul prior to the existence of the body leads to 
the former’s attachment to, and concomitance with, the latter.5  
These are problems that led Avicenna to reject the Platonic view of the eternity 
of the soul, and given his reasons for the immateriality of the soul, he was led to 
the view of the spiritual incipience thereof. However, the latter view was 
subjected to serious objections by Avicenna’s critics, in particular, Khwājah 
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī6 and Mullā Ṣadrā. One such objection, raised by Mullā 
                                                           
4. F. AL-RĀZĪ, al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqīyyah fī ‘Ilm al-Ilāhīyyat wa l-Ṭabī’īyyāt 
[Eastern Studies in Theology and Natural Sciences], 2 vols. (Qom: Bidār Publications, 
1370 SH), vol. II, 390-391. 
5. H. AVICENNA, al-Mabda’ wa l-Ma’ād [Beginning and Resurrection], 310. 
6. AL-TŪSĪ, Naṣīr al-Dīn Muḥammad, was born in 1201 in Khorasan. Philosopher, 
theologian, and author of about 150 works, he was considered a “third master,” after 
Aristotle and al-Fārābī. His studies included Arabic, logic, metaphysics, mathematics, 
medicine, law, religion, and natural sciences. Ṭūsī established in Maragha the largest 
astronomical observatory of the times. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is considered one of the 
most important figures of Islamic thinking. He was one of the most prolific scholars of 
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Ṣadrā, is that if the concomitance of a soul and a body is deemed accidental, rather 
than essential, then this would conflict with the idea that the soul is the “form” of 
the body. For Avicenna and his followers specify that the soul is a perfective form 
for a natural organic body, holding that the combination of the soul and the body 
results in a new kind (or species), and since such a combination cannot result 
from two entities that do not bear a causal relation to one another, the soul and 
the body should have a necessary concomitance, such as a hylomorphic (or form-
matter) relation.7  
In his account of how the soul comes to exist, Avicenna rejects all four kinds of 
causal relations (efficient causation, material causation, formal causation, and 
teleological causation) between the body and the soul. He ultimately identifies 
the mode of the relation between the body and the incipience of the soul in terms 
of the body being a ‘condition’ for the incipience of the immaterial soul as 
brought about by an immaterial efficient cause (that is, the Active Intellect, al-
‘aql al-fa’āāl). He takes the condition to be a requirement for the soul’s incipience 
so that he may not be faced with the problem of the nonexistence of what is 
conditioned (i.e. the soul) in case the condition (i.e. the body) becomes 
                                                           
the thirteenth century, and left his mark on most literary and scientific disciplines. 
[See: PANZECA, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, In: Lagerlund H. (eds.) Encyclopedia of 
Medieval Philosophy, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006)]. 
7. M. MULLĀ SADRĀ, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta’ālīyah fī l-Asfār al-‘Aqlīyyah al-Arba’ah 
[The Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Journeys], 9 vols. (Qom: 
Maktabat al-Muṣṭafawī, 1368 SH), vol. VIII, 382.   
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nonexistent. For otherwise, it would conflict with the survival of the soul after the 
destruction of the body. In Avicenna’s view, this condition can serve as the soul’s 
means for the acquisition of perfections. As a result of this condition, the soul 
will find a penchant to manipulate the body, but it cannot serve as a condition 
whose nonexistence leads to the nonexistence of what is conditioned.8  
Mullā Ṣadrā objects, however, to such a formulation of the relation between the 
soul and the body: if the soul is a perfective form and a primary perfection for the 
body, then it must be the determinant, and constitutive of the essence, of the new 
kind resulting from the soul and the body. How, then, can the causal relation 
between the two be ruled out? He goes on to say that the existence of a single 
entity that has potentiality, and is, nonetheless, a condition for the incipience of 
something immaterial does not make any sense. For the immaterial entity is, for 
Peripatetic philosophers, a substance which is in its essence detached from, and 
not in need of, the matter.9 Basically, it should be noted that detachment from 
matter is essential for an immaterial detached substance, and an essential entity 
is not accidentally acquired, just as it can never go away. Now if the immateriality 
or detachment from matter is, as Avicenna maintains, essential for the detached 
                                                           
8. F. AL-RĀZĪ, al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqīyyah fī ‘Ilm al-Ilāhīyyat wa l-Ṭabī’īyyāt 
[Eastern Studies in Theology and Natural Sciences], II, 400. 
9.  M. MULLĀ SADRĀ, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta’ālīyah fī l-Asfār al-‘Aqlīyyah al-Arba’ah 
[The Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Journeys], VIII, 385. 
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substance of the soul, then how can it disappear because of something accidental 
(i.e. the relation with the body)? 
Another serious objection levelled by Khwājah Naṣīr al-Ṭūsī, at the theory of the 
spiritual incipience of the soul is that if the material body managed to occasion 
the emergence of an immaterial soul in one way or another, then why could it not 
occasion its disappearance? In a letter he wrote to Khusrowshāhī, another 
philosopher of his time, al-Ṭūsī asks: why do Avicenna and his followers 
acknowledge the incipience of the human soul, and yet refuse to acknowledge the 
possibility of its destruction? If they characterize the body as a vehicle for the 
possibility of the soul’s existence, then why do they not conceive it as a vehicle 
for the possibility of the soul’s nonexistence? And if the immateriality of the soul 
is the reason why the body cannot be a vehicle for the possibility of the soul’s 
nonexistence (so that the possibility of its nonexistence after its incipience is ruled 
out), then why is the same immateriality not deemed a reason for the view that 
the body cannot be a vehicle for the existence of the soul, in which case the very 
incipience of the soul is ruled out? In short, for al-Ṭūsī, there is no difference in 
the equality of both relations—that of the possibility of existence and that of the 
possibility of nonexistence.10 
                                                           
10. N. AL-TŪSĪ, Ajwibat al-Masā’il al-Naṣīrīyyah [Answers to Nasiri Questions], 
(Tehran: Humanities Research Center, 1383 SH(, 266. 
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Drawing on his principle of the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), Mullā 
Ṣadrā highlights the above objection as follows: it does not help to say that if A 
is the condition for the incipience of B in such a way that B does not need A in 
its existence, then it will be impossible for the nonexistence of A to result in the 
nonexistence of B. This is because the incipience of something is nothing but its 
particular way of existence; that is, incipience is not an attribute additional or 
accidental to something’s existence, and so, a condition for incipience will not be 
something other than a condition for existence. To the contrary, a condition for 
incipience is also a condition for existence, and thus, the nonexistence of the 
condition (the body) results in the nonexistence of what is conditioned (the 
soul).11 
 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s View of the Physical Incipience of the Soul 
Mullā Ṣadrā established the primacy of existence as the foundation of his 
philosophical system, and in this framework, he viewed the soul as being of 
physical incipience—that the soul begins as a physical entity. While he rejects 
any discrimination of souls in terms of accidental properties they have acquired 
via bodies, he introduces ‘modes of existence’ as distinctive features of the souls 
after death. For, in his view, souls as forms of bodies have a material mode of 
                                                           
11. M. MULLĀ SADRĀ, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta’ālīyah fī l-Asfār al-‘Aqlīyyah al-Arba’ah 
[The Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Journeys], VIII, 384. 
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existence, and prior to their incipience, matter plays a role as preparatory for its 
incipience and its attachment to the body. When an individual instance of the 
quiddity comes to exist based on such material preparatory ground, the 
destruction of such ground does not disrupt its survival and changes only its 
‘mode of existence’ from a controlling attached existence to a perfectly detached 
existence.12  Obviously, this picture of the human soul is at odds with Avicenna’s. 
According to Avicenna’s version of dualism, the immateriality of the soul is full 
or perfect at the very time of its incipience, the soul starting out as a detached 
intellect (al-‘aql al-mufāriq). However, such status or degree is acquired by the 
soul, on the Sadraean account, only after a substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-
jawharīyyah) and the acquisition of existential perfections in the afterlife. 
In fact, on Mullā Ṣadrā’s account, the relation of the soul to the body, or the 
attachment between them, is not analogous to that between an owner and a house 
or a sea captain and the ship, which are destructible or revocable. Instead, the 
‘soul-hood’ of the soul (that is, its attachment to, and control of, the body) is, just 
like the ‘matter-hood’ of the matter or the ‘form-hood’ of the form, a necessary 
concomitant of its essence, arising from its mode of existence. Thus, as long as 
the soul is a soul, it has an attached existence, and once it arrives at perfection in 
its existence and develops into a detached intellect, its mode of existence will also 
                                                           
12. M. MULLĀ SADRĀ, al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbīyyah fī l-Manāhij al-Sulūkīyyah [The 
Lordly Evidence in Methods of Spiritual Journey], (Mashhad: al-Markaz al-Jāmi’ī li-l-
Nashr, 1360 SH), 222.  
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change.13 Mullā Ṣadrā strongly emphasizes union in kind, as in the definition of 
the soul as the form of a natural body. Thus, their combination gives rise to a 
‘natural kind’ with a material dimension. The main point in his view is that, 
instead of a (dualistic) understanding of the soul and the body as two distinct 
substances, he conceives of them in terms of a single substance with an existential 
union which has a material and an immaterial aspect. 
Mīr Sayyid Sharīf, ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Jurjānī,14 has objected to Avicenna’s 
version of dualism to the effect that a real combination between an actually 
immaterial entity and an actually material entity does not make sense. In his 
commentaries on Ḥikmat al-‘Ayn, he points out that the soul and the body falls 
under a separate genera (one under immaterial substances and the other under 
material substances), and thus, no real combination between them is possible. 
In response to the objection, Mullā Ṣadrā emphasizes that the soul is not purely 
immaterial from the outset, namely, at the time of its incipience. To the contrary, 
since it is the form of a natural body and constitutes a material kind, it has a 
material incipience; hence, a material existence. An immaterial entity which 
essentially involves a manipulative and controlling attachment to the matter is 
                                                           
13.  M. MULLĀ SADRĀ, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta’ālīyah fī l-Asfār al-‘Aqlīyyah al-Arba’ah 
[The Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Journeys], VIII, 373. 
14. AL-JURJĀNĪ, Ali ibn Muhammad (al-Sayyid al-Sharif), the author of more than 50 
books, was a Persian grammarian, philosopher and linguist during the 14th and early 
15th century. 
[See: V. DONZEL, Islamic Desk Reference. (Leiden: BRILL, 1994), 192].  
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neither purely immaterial nor purely material. Thus, the mode of the existence of 
a soul is neither totally detached from the matter and its features, as in purely 
immaterial entities, nor entirely at the level of the matter, as in purely material 
entities. Instead, according to him, the mode of its existence is a particular one, 
and thus, it is essential for the soul to be attached to, and to control, the body 
(since this is part of its mode of existence), rather than accidental to it. In 
Avicenna’s view, however, the attachment to the body, and manipulations therein 
were deemed accidental to the detached essence of the soul. Mullā Sadrā 
emphasizes that if we take these features to be accidental, it will seriously come 
into conflict with the view or definition of the soul as the ‘form’ of a natural body 
and their ‘union in kind.’ 
Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the soul, as long as it exists as a soul, is essentially 
imperfect and in need of a body as its vehicle or instrument for the acquisition of 
its existential perfections that helps it in its substantial motion from potentiality 
to actuality.15 Thus, contrary to Avicenna’s view, he characterizes the body as a 
material cause of the soul, and thus, believes that an essential attachment holds 
between the two. However, in his own terms, Avicenna’s view implies that the 
relation between a detached immaterial soul and a material body is just like the 
relation between a piece of stone and a human person (which involves no 
necessary or essential link). Mullā Ṣadrā emphasizes that the instrumentality of 
                                                           
15 . Ibid, IX, 116. 
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the body for the soul is not analogous to, say, the instrumentality of a saw for a 
carpenter or a ship for a sea captain as they can be deployed or put aside whenever 
their owners wish.16  
As pointed out, during the soul’s connection to a body, Mullā Ṣadrā characterizes 
it as a simple immaterial (that is, above matter) entity in an intermediary state 
between purely material and purely immaterial entities. On this view, the zygote 
undergoes certain changes, whereby it develops from a vegetative form to an 
animate form. Thus, the embryo comes to have a low degree of immateriality by 
having features of an animate life. Then, its developments continue, and with its 
existential expansion (al-si’at al-wujūdīyyah), it develops a rational human soul, 
coming to have features of human life. This course of developments is the 
substantial motion of the soul. The rational soul with its features of a human life 
enjoys the immateriality peculiar to the existence of a soul, as distinct from both 
purely material substances and purely immaterial substances, as a third category 
in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. 
 
An Overview and Critique of Arguments for the Immateriality of the Soul 
Despite the major difference between Avicenna’s philosophy and Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
Transcendent Wisdom (al-Ḥikmat al-Muta’ālīyah) over the mode of the 
                                                           
16 . See: Ibid, VIII, 383-384. 
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incipience of the soul and its mode of immateriality, they both subscribe to the 
immateriality of the human soul in their own ways. Accordingly, they present 
arguments for the immateriality of the soul, some of which I overview and 
criticize in what follows. 
 
The first argument 
Earlier formulations of the argument were offered by Avicenna in the psychology 
part of his Book of Healing (Kitāb al-Shifā’) and Fakhr al-Rāzī in his al-Mabāḥith 
al-Mashriqīyya for immateriality of the ‘human’ soul. Mullā Ṣadrā presents the 
same argument, with slight modifications, for immateriality of the ‘animal’ soul. 
Here is the argument: 
The animal (as well as the human) body undergoes quantitative changes 
throughout its life. Now if the soul were a material form inherent (or ‘imprinted’ 
[munṭabi’ah]) in the body, then it had to change with changes in the body. 
Nevertheless, the identity of the person remains the same throughout life. 
Therefore, the soul is over and above the body or any material changes. It should 
be noted that the soul has its own substantial motion or change, but its identity is 
preserved in terms of its own continuity, and the individuation of the body, 
despite all its changes, is sustained via the individuation of the soul. 
15 
 
Although it is rather difficult to establish ‘personal identity’ in the case of non-
human animals, such identity seems obvious and intuitive in the case of human 
beings. Contemporary physicalists respond to such arguments in terms of the 
organic unity and continuity of human and animal bodies across time (from birth 
to death). When they say mind is identical with body, as Kim has mentioned, they 
do not mean that mind is identical with a "time slice" of body; but with a four-
dimensional object – a three-dimensional object stretched along the temporal 
dimension – which has different material constituents at different times. In any 
case, it is a clearly delineated system with a substantial unity.17  
Proponents of the immateriality of the soul explain the organic character of the 
body in terms of its existential connection to a soul. Thus, once the soul departs 
from its body (at the time of death), the organic character of the body collapses. 
Physicalists can, in turn, provide a biological account of the organic nature of the 
body and why it collapses at the time of death in terms of the functions of neural 
systems, blood circulation, and the like. Thus, the above argument does not seem 
to be cogent enough to support the immateriality of the soul. 
 
The second argument 
                                                           
17. J. KIM, philosophy of mind, 3rd ed., (New York: Westview Press, 2010), 26. 
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Frequent observations and experiences indicate that animals seek pleasure and 
avoid pain. Thus, they must have knowledge or awareness of their pleasure and 
pain, and such knowledge implies their knowledge of their own selves or 
essences. For knowledge of one’s pleasure is not possible without knowledge of 
oneself—this is an instance of the following principle: in cases of “genitive 
constructions,” such as Hasan’s book (or the book of Hasan)—where “book” is 
called the construction’s ‘head’ and “Hasan” is called its ‘modifier’—it is 
impossible to have knowledge of the whole construction without having 
knowledge of the modifier. 
An animal’s self-knowledge is, however, the same as the presence of the known 
thing to it, and an entity with self-knowledge or self-cognition has an existence 
for itself (wujūd li-nafsih). Thus, the animal soul will have an existence for itself, 
which is distinct from immanence or inherence in the matter (existence for a 
matter or existence for another [wujūd li-ghayrih]). Therefore, whatever has self-
knowledge is detached from matter and location. 
Moreover, an animal’s self-knowledge is not gained through senses or reasoning. 
For in this case, self-knowledge would disappear had there been no senses or 
reasoning. On the other hand, part of the animal’s self-knowledge (such as 
knowledge of its own body) which is gained via senses will no longer be 
17 
 
sustained, absent any senses. Accordingly, difference in types of knowledge 
implies a difference in types of objects of knowledge.18  
To assess this argument, we should first note that the argument ignores a real 
distinction between epistemological and ontological implications, where the 
latter do not necessarily follow from the former. If it is really the case that humans 
or animals cannot have awareness of their bodies without having sensory 
perceptions, whereas they might have awareness of their own selves even without 
such perceptions, then this fact can at best imply an epistemological distinction 
between one’s body and one’s self. However, from this distinction one cannot 
infer an ontological distinction between the two. 
In addition to the conflation between epistemology and ontology, the assumption 
that matter cannot possess cognition or consciousness has been seriously 
challenged by physicalists, and so, it cannot be taken for granted without any 
argument. In recent decades, there have been vast attempts at offering 
physicalistic theories on conscious states, which are still in process, and some of 
them do not even address the identical approach, to be targeted by traditional 
objections against the possibility of physical consciousness. So, the above 
argument can’t bypass easily the rejection of physical consciousness. 
                                                           
18. See: M. MULLĀ SADRĀ, al-Ḥikmat al-Muta’ālīyah fī l-Asfār al-‘Aqlīyyah al-
Arba’ah [The Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Journeys], VIII, 42-44. 
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What is more, one can obtain knowledge of one’s body and knowledge of one’s 
self are via two different modalities: respectively, ‘perception’ and 
‘introspection’ where the former disappears in the absence of senses, unlike the 
latter. The argument draws on the type-difference of the two cases of knowledge 
to conclude that their objects are also type-different. However, it is possible to 
have knowledge of one and the same entity through two different modalities. 
Obviously, the conditions in which knowledge is obtained through a visual 
perceptual modality is different from those in which it is obtained through an 
introspective modality, but this is not sufficient to establish the difference in what 
is known in these two ways. 
Finally, in the first part of the argument, the existence of the soul for itself is 
allegedly established by an appeal to the presence of the known to the knower, 
which is in turn based on the soul’s immateriality—but this is question-begging. 
In fact, the conclusion of the argument is already presumed in its premises. 
Moreover, the argument draws on the assumption that the materiality of the soul 
would amount to its immanence or inherence in matter (as an existence for 
another) to argue against its materiality. However, contemporary physicalists do 
not construe a material mind as an existence for another. Instead, in many cases, 
they construe it as an existence for itself, although it is material. 
 
The third argument 
19 
 
This is the ‘flying man’ argument first presented by Avicenna in favor of the 
immateriality of the human soul. The argument asks us to imagine that a human 
being is created all at once without any bodily senses. Suppose that he is located 
in a void, and thus, he has no perception of sensory qualities. Moreover, his body 
members, such as his fingers, are so distant from one another that he has no tactile 
sensation. Notwithstanding this, he can still perceive his own essence, while he 
is ignorant of all his exterior and interior body parts. And it is obvious that what 
is perceived is different from what is left unnoticed. Therefore, his identity is 
different from his body parts taken together.19  
Mullā Ṣadrā has extended the argument from human beings to non-human 
animals, but it is objectionable. In his commentaries on al-Asfār, ‘Allāmah 
Ṭabāṭabā’ī20 writes: “it is not implausible to reject this argument, particularly with 
respect to non-human animals”.21 Ṭabāṭabā’ī may have as well pointed out the 
weakness of the argument—even in the case of human beings—because it 
                                                           
19 . See: H. AVICENNA, Al-Shifā’; Al-Ṭabī’īyyāt [The book of Healing; Natural 
Sciences], II (The section on Psychology), 13. 
20. ṬABĀTABĀ’Ī, Muhammad Husayn (1902-1981) was one of the most prominent 
thinkers of contemporary Shia Islam. He is commonly known as Allamah 
Tabataba'i and was a philosopher, a prolific writer, and an inspiring teacher to his 
students who devoted much of his life to Islamic studies. His written books number 
forty-four titles overall; three of which are collections of his articles.  
[For more information, see: H. ALGAR, 2006, "Allamah Muhammad Husayn 
Tabataba’i, Philosopher, Exegete and Gnostic", Journal of Islamic Studies, 17 (3): 
326-351.] 
21 . M. ṬABĀTABĀ’Ī, commentaries on al-Ḥikmat al-Muta’ālīyah fī l-Asfār al-
Arba’ah [The Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Journeys], 9 vols. (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ 
al-Turath, 1981), vol. VIII, 44. 
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involves an extension of an epistemic distinction to an ontological distinction. 
For, as Avicenna himself says, what is established for a flying man (that is, 
essence or soul) is distinct from what is not established (that is, the body and its 
parts). However, he immediately concludes that “such a person can understand 
that the existence of his soul is different from the existence of his body”.22 This 
is where the epistemological-ontological confusion takes place, which is similar 
to the objection raised by analytic philosophers to Descartes’s argument in which 
he accounted for the epistemic distinction between the mind and the body in terms 
of their ontological distinction. 
One might suggest that the ‘flying man’ argument refers to intellectual knowledge 
by presence (in human beings) and estimative knowledge by presence (in non-
human animals). Such knowledge is obtained in the depths of the soul, and if 
something additional to the essence of the immaterial soul were involved in 
obtaining such knowledge, then it had to be evident within that knowledge by 
presence, but this is not the case. Therefore, self-knowledge is not a bodily 
property. 
Such a response is, at this stage of our dialectic, question-begging. Physicalists, 
often, deny the immateriality or distinctness of the soul altogether, and so, they 
would not admit knowledge by presence as part of the issue. As they see things, 
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II (The section on Psychology), 13. 
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self-knowledge in the flying man is supplied via a physical or bodily structure, 
and the assumption that such knowledge is knowledge by presence or a direct 
intuition by an immaterial soul will undermine the course of the argument. For 
example, according to the mind-body identity theory, a certain conscious mental 
state—such as self-cognition or self-knowledge—is exactly the same as, or 
identical to, a certain neural state in the brain. Now how could the identity theory 
be undermined if the flying man does not see his body but cognizes his own self? 
Proponents of such a physicalistic view – and there are many of them – can easily 
respond: the flying man still has his neural connections in place, and the particular 
neural state, to which self-cognition is identical, is there in his head. It is only that 
he is not aware of his body and his brain. Nevertheless, his lack of knowledge of 
such neural states and their identity with his mental states does not challenge their 
existence and does not prove anything beyond neural states. Such a response can 
also be provided by proponents of some other widely advocated physicalistic 
views about consciousness, such as representationalism. 
In a footnote to an edited version of Avicenna’s Book of Healing, there is a 
possible objection to the flying man argument and a reply to it: 
If it is objected that the locus of consciousness is the humor itself, then it 
should be replied that the humor can only perceive in a passive way, and a 
passive humor that has changed without having preserved the state 
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preceding its encounter with the sensible entity is different from the soul 
that did not become passive and has received the sensible.23  
According to Avicenna’s view, the humor is a combination of the four elements 
(water, fire, earth, and air) in a particular proportion to a moderate extent such 
that the conflicts among these elements do not lead to the collapse of the 
combination. Thus, the humor should be understood as equivalent to a material 
composition. The elements of such composition and the mechanism of how it is 
formed were, of course, rejected following advances in the empirical sciences and 
the repudiation of the belief in the four elements. However, the humor can be 
more generally conceived of as a material composition to which the soul is 
attached. 
Notwithstanding this, the above objection suggests that mental states and 
properties (such as consciousness or awareness) belong to this material 
composition, not to the immaterial soul. In principle, if the humor is the locus of 
self-consciousness or self-awareness, then even if one were, just like the flying 
man, in a condition in which he does not perceive any sensory qualities, including 
his own body, self-awareness or self-knowledge would still occur in the humor 
as its locus, and so, such self-knowledge does not imply the existence of an 
immaterial soul. For if there is no immaterial soul, self-knowledge would still 
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Healing], (Qom: Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute, 1388 SH), p. 56. 
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turn out to be knowledge of the sensible body, even if in certain conditions, such 
as the flying man scenario, one could only have internal knowledge thereof, rather 
than knowledge of the body’s sensory qualities. 
In response to the problem, the above commentator adopts the following strategy: 
the humor—as a material composition—changes and undergoes a passive state in 
the process of its knowledge of the sensibles (such as knowledge of the body), 
while the immaterial soul knows the sensibles (including its own body) without 
undergoing any changes. Therefore, the humor prior to knowledge of the body is 
different from the humor after knowledge of the body. However, in the flying 
man example, a self-constancy or invariability is intuitively perceived after 
knowledge of the sensory qualities of the body; that is, when conditions change 
and knowledge of such qualities is obtained, the self as perceived prior to such 
knowledge of the body and the self as perceived thereafter are the same. 
However, a physicalist can point out a number of drawbacks in this response. 
First, if the immaterial soul is denied, then self-knowledge will be reduced to 
knowledge of the sensible body. Now such knowledge is once obtained through 
an introspective modality (prior to seeing or otherwise sensing the body) and once 
again through visual or other sorts of perceptual modalities (subsequent to seeing 
or otherwise sensing the body). When the object of perception in both cases is the 
same (that is, the sensible body) and it is only the perceptual modality that 
changes, then it is not obvious how the above response can be thought to work. 
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What the response amounts to is that, in knowledge of the sensible body, the 
humor undergoes changes and passive states. However, prior to seeing or 
otherwise sensing the body, for example in a flying man scenario, knowledge of 
the sensible body is obtained through an introspective modality. What reason is 
there to think that when the modality changes, the humor will still remain passive? 
Moreover, even if we concede that the humor changes—despite the change of the 
modality—many physicalists have acknowledged and theorized multiple 
realization. That is, one mental state can be realized in the form of multiple 
physical or neural states. For example, one strategy adopted by mind-brain 
identity theorists is to reduce a certain mental state to a ‘certain type’ of a physical 
or neural structure, instead of reducing it to a ‘certain token’ of such structure.  
Some other physicalists advocating theories other than mind-body identity 
theories, such as the mind’s supervenience on the body or versions of 
functionalist theories can a fortiori account for multiple realizability and 
overcome the above objection. They can say that even if the humor (as a material 
composition that serves as the locus of self-cognition) changes, this would 
amount to a change in the physical or neural base of the mental state in question, 
while one and the same mental state (such as self-knowledge) can still be realized 




The fourth argument 
The main idea behind this argument, which was appealed to in different Islamic 
philosophical books, is that human beings can grasp universal concepts that do 
not involve material characteristics and accidents, and there is a general principle 
to the effect that such concepts, which are abstract from material accidents, can 
only be possessed by an immaterial entity. 
In the Book of Healing and volume 8 of al-Asfār al-Arba’ah [The Four Journeys], 
the case for the second premise of the argument (that is, the general principle) is 
made as follows: if there is a universal concept that is immanent or inherent in a 
physical object, then it must inhere either in an indivisible part thereof (that is, a 
classical mathematical notion of a point) or in a divisible part. If it inheres in a 
point, then the point is either essentially individuated as distinct from a line or it 
is not. However, it has been elaborately argued for in these books that a point is 
not distinct or separate from the line (that is, it is the end of the line and is 
dependent thereon). Therefore, whatever inheres in a point is indeed inherent in 
a line. Thus, we will only need to proceed with the following assumption: 
inherence in a divisible physical object. In this case, the abstract universal concept 
should be infinitely divisible in virtue of the divisibility of its locus, because the 
existence of an indivisible part is impossible. However, it is impossible for an 
abstract universal concept to be divisible. So, an intelligible form, or a universal 
concept, cannot inhere in a physical object, such as a human body. 
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This argument has been challenged within the paradigm of Islamic philosophy; 
for example, by an analysis of the universal concept. Here I will consider it from 
the viewpoint of contemporary physicalists. As evident, the argument assumes 
that the rejection of the immateriality of the soul is tantamount to the belief in the 
inherence or immanence of the contents of mental states in the brain, with no 
alternative being imaginable. 
The assumption might be in place given earlier materialist views of the past 
centuries, against which the argument is indeed presented. However, 
contemporary physicalism about mental states—particularly, intentional states 
such as beliefs and thoughts that are about things—has widely acknowledged 
externalism. In a nutshell, externalism is the view that intentional content—as a 
whole or at least as part of its base—supervenes on external objects and 
properties, and thus, no intentional state is realized by the brain in fully internal 
terms. In metaphysics of properties in contemporary analytic philosophy, 
extrinsic properties are contrasted to intrinsic properties, and properties such as 
knowing or believing or thinking are said to be conceivable as extrinsic 
properties. For example, a significant number of externalists explain knowledge 
of a content in terms of a certain mode of representing that content, and thus, the 
content will also be defined externally; hence, it will not be in the brain either 
fully or at all. Externalism was first propounded by Hilary Putnam in 1975 with 
respect to natural kind terms and was then generalized by Tyler Burge in 1979 
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and 1982 to contents of intentional states.24 Today externalism is endorsed by the 
majority of analytic philosophers. 
Moreover, since the last decade of the twentieth century, externalist or wide 
intentionalist views of phenomenal states25 such as perception (visual, auditory, 
or tactile perceptions of colors, shapes, sounds, and the like), bodily sensations 
(such as pain, itching, and orgasm), and emotions (such as anger and happiness) 
were proposed and are widely advocated by well-known physicalists. The view 
known as representationalism accounts for contents of phenomenal states in 
externalist terms, with no requirement of it being inherent in the brain. 
In fact, the strategy adopted by Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā in this and other similar 
arguments was to reject the rival view in order to establish their favorable theory. 
Thus, they first reject the view that concepts or ideas are inherent or imprinted in 
the brain and then conclude that the mind or soul (that grasps such concepts or 
ideas) must be immaterial. The strategy seems plausible only if all other 
alternatives are rejected. Regardless of how one can imagine all possible versions 
of physicalism, these arguments as presented by Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā only 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 97–120. 
25. Mental states with phenomenal properties; that is, there is something it is like 
to experience them. 
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target one physicalist alternative at best, which is the mind-brain identity theory, 
without taking other alternatives into consideration. 
One might say that physicalistic views are concerned with particularized, rather 
than universal, properties, whereas the above argument concerns universal 
concepts. So, physicalistic views of universal concepts may as well be similar to 
the views of Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā. Before I address universal properties in 
the views of contemporary physicalists, I should first note that all intentional 
contents—either particularized or universal—are accounted for in Islamic 
philosophy in terms of their presence to the soul. Thus, if an argument just like 
the above argument is reformulated in terms of knowledge or grasp of particular 
forms, it will ignore contemporary externalist versions of physicalism and will 
not be really aimed at this view. As explained before, for externalists, intentional 
contents are not inherent or imprinted in the brain, and knowledge, belief, or 
thought occur as representations (or functions) of contents that are determined by 
external properties. 
Universal concepts are not regarded by major contemporary physicalists as 
detached from matter. Very few contemporary analytic philosophers believe in 
Platonic universals, whereas many of them adhere to other views about the 
metaphysics of universals, such as the view that claims about universals are 
indeed distorted ways of talking about linguistic phrases, or the theory of tropes 
according to which all properties, even those that appear to be about universals, 
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are indeed particularized.26 Thus, according to views adopted by many 
contemporary physicalists about universals, there is no difference, with respect to 
the issue at hand, between knowledge, belief, and thought about a universal 
concept, on the one hand, and knowledge, belief, and thought about a 
particularized concept, on the other, since they both refer to particular properties. 
Therefore, the above remarks about externalism concerning the content of 
intentional states apply, by the same token, to universal contents too. So, 
according to these contemporary philosophers, contents involving universal 
concepts or properties are determined externally (and not merely by the brain), 
and knowledge of such contents exists as a representation (or function) of such 
externalist contents. Thus, Avicenna’s argument does not address, let alone reject, 
such views. 
Another important point is that mind-brain identity theorists do not say that 
grasped concepts or forms are imprinted in the brain. Instead, they say that the 
mental state of grasping a concept, C, or a form, F, is identical to a neural state, 
N. The identity of the mental state of grasping universal concepts of HUMAN or 
UNITY, or the mental state of visually perceiving a mountain or a sea to certain 
neural states does not obviously amount to these concepts or ideas being 
imprinted in neural networks. The point is not that intentional contents are 
                                                           
26. See: M. LOUX, Metaphysics; A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd ed., (Oxford: 
Routledge 2006), Ch. 1 & 2. 
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identical to neural states; it is the identification of an intentional mental state, M, 
to a neural state, N. It is safe to say that any argument to the effect that it is 
impossible for such intentional states to be imprinted or inherent in the neural 
network is a misunderstanding in the first place, adopting a wrong strategy. Such 
an argument is ineffective not only against externalist physicalist views but also 
against internalist physicalist views.  
The above remarks also apply mutatis mutandis to a number of other arguments 
presented by Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā for the soul’s immateriality. For they all 
appeal to the impossibility of known forms imprinting in brain cells or sensitive 
organs in order to show that knowledge or cognition is only possible for an 
immaterial soul. By the same token, the problem with the well-known argument 
from the “impossibility of the large being imprinted in the small” (inṭibā’ al-kabīr 
fī l-ṣaghīr) becomes obvious. 
 
The fifth argument 
In the psychology section (Kitāb al-Nafs) of his Book of Healing, Avicenna 
presents this argument as his fourth argument for the immateriality of the soul. In 
a nutshell, the argument is that something with multiple parts possesses a unity 
in its entirety that cannot be divided. That is, while even particular objects, such 
as the desk or the chair in my office, have numerous parts and, unlike intelligibles, 
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are not simple, they have a unity in that they are whole and separate objects on 
their own. Now the question arises of how this unified object can, with respect to 
its unity, exist in a divisible locus. In other words, the human brain—as the locus 
for the immanence of forms—has different and divisible parts. Now if forms of 
particular objects, such as particular desks and chairs, are to be imprinted in the 
brain of a perceiver, then how will their unity be imprinted? Avicenna concludes 
that the perceiver of the forms of particular objects must be immaterial.27  
In his consideration of objections to the previous argument (from universal 
concepts), Mullā Ṣadrā deals with the following objection: one counter-example 
to the argument may well be the attribute of unity, because it is, on the one hand, 
simple and indivisible, and an attribute of physical objects, on the other, which 
amounts to the inherence of the property of unity in these objects. As a 
consequence, the unity which consists in simplicity and indivisibility inheres in 
divisible physical objects. 
In response to the objection, Mullā Ṣadrā says that although, the unity of 
immaterial entities is indivisible, the unity of physical objects is not. The unity of 
such objects is continuous or is even nothing over and above physical continuity 
or extension, and since the existence of a physical object is divisible, its unity is 
also divisible. It should be noted here, nevertheless, that the unity of physical 
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objects is not, unlike the divisibility of their accidental qualities, divisible in 
virtue of the divisibility of the objects themselves; it is the same as such 
divisibility (whereas a quality such as color is divisible only in virtue of the 
physical object). The upshot is that the unity of physical objects is not only 
accidentally divisible but also essentially so. The unity of physical objects, 
therefore, is different from that of the soul.28 This response by Mullā Ṣadrā can 
indeed be seen as a response to the above argument as well. 
Moreover, as explained before, many physicalists since the last decades of the 
twentieth century believe in externalism about contents of intentional states (such 
as beliefs and thoughts) and even those of sensory perceptions. Thus, the above 
argument cannot be seen as directed against contemporary physicalist views, 
because it assumes that the rejection of the immateriality of the soul amounts to 
the view that perceived forms are inherent in the brain. 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the above remarks, although Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā—as founders 
of the two main strands in Islamic philosophy—believe in the immateriality of 
the soul, their accounts of how the soul comes to exist (or its incipience) and the 
sense in which it is immaterial are very different. Avicenna talks about substance 
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dualism and the spiritual incipience of the soul, assigning distinct or even 
conflicting functions or tasks to each of the soul and the body, where engagement 
in one type of activity might prevent the soul from engagement in the other. 
However, Mullā Ṣadrā talks about a version of substance monism that 
accommodates different degrees (a material and an immaterial degree) of 
existence. Moreover, he provides a physical account of the incipience of the soul, 
which gradually arrives at immateriality or detachment from the matter in the 
course of its substantial motion. However, the soul is, for Mullā Ṣadrā, the form 
of a natural body that constitutes a material kind. Thus, for him, the soul is in an 
intermediary state between purely material and purely immaterial entities. 
However, since both Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in the immateriality of 
the soul in one way or another, they have offered arguments to establish its 
immateriality simpliciter. In this paper, I have overviewed and examined some of 
the most important and best-known arguments they have presented. As we have 
seen, considered from the viewpoint of modern philosophy, these arguments 
seem to suffer from serious problems. Some of them—such as the argument from 
animal self-knowledge and the flying man argument—confuse between 
epistemological and ontological aspects, in addition to other specific problems of 
their own. Others—such as the argument from the indivisibility of universal 
concepts, the argument from the ‘impossibility of the larger being imprinted in 
the small,’ and the argument from the indivisibility of the unity of objects—
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cannot indeed be thought as directed at recent externalist physicalist views, and 
thus, they cannot present a challenge for them. Even with respect to internalist 
physicalist theories—particularly, the mind-brain identity theory—we have 
shown that the purpose of arguments that try to reject the imprinting of contents 
of intentional states in the brain is entirely different from what proponents of the 
identity of mental states with neural states want to establish, and thus, these 
arguments cannot be presented against these theories. 
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